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Abstract. In this paper we show how to extend KEM, a tableau-like
proof system for normal modal logic, in order to deal with classes of
non-normal modal logics, such as monotonic and regular, in a uniform
and modular way.
1 Introduction
Non-normal modal logics have a long tradition, however, despite their heritage
they have been the subject of a very few recent attempts of mechanization
[6,8,9]. One of the main reasons for this underdeveloppement is that modern
automated proof techniques are mainly semantic based, and non-normal modal
logics have more complex semantic structures than normal modal logics. Never-
theless Hilbert systems for non-normal modal logics are very close to those for
normal modal logics: they lack the axiom 2> or the equivalent rule of necessi-
tation (A/2A).
The second objection to non-normal modal logics we would like to answer
to is that concerning their possible applications. The necessitation rule is a very
strong inference rule and it comports significant consequences; for example un-
der the epistemic interpretation of the modal operators, it implies omniscience:
the agent must be an ideal agent, i.e., it must be a perfect reasoner and it must
have unlimited computational ability. This seems to be a very unrealistic as-
sumption so some scholars (see, among others, [4,13,11,12,14]) suggested to use
non-normal modal logics to model epistemic reasoning. On the other hand one
could argue this does not obtain when more exact disciplines such as mathemat-
ics are involved. However, this is not the case: it is well known that provability
in Peano arithmetic can be represented with the normal modal logic GL, but
some classes of arithmetic formulas (i.e., Σ1-sentences) are represented by a
non-normal modal logic [2].
It is not the aim of this work to investigate applications of non-normal modal
logics. Instead we want to present a tableau-like proof system (called KEM) for
classes of non-normal modal logics, namely: regular and monotonic. The main
feature of KEM is its label formalism studied to simulate the semantics of modal
logics. The differences between the various classes of modal logics are embedded
in the definition of the basic unification; however, the various extensions (in each
class) arising from modal axioms are dealt with in a uniform way wrt the various
classes.
In Section 1 we shall resume briefly the basic of non-normal modal logic,
then, in the following sections we shall describe KEM in details. More precisely
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in Section 4 we introduce the label formalism, then, in Section 5, we describe the
unification mechanism for dealing with the various classes of non-normal modal
logic, and in Section 6 we present KEM inference rules. Finally, in Section 7, we
outline the soundness and completeness proofs.
2 Non-Normal Modal Logics
We shall consider only modal logics extending classical propositional logic, and
where the modal operators 2 and 3 are the dual of each other (i.e., 2↔ ¬3¬).
The rules we use to extend classical propositional logic are:
` (A1 ∧ · · · ∧An)→ A
` (2A1 ∧ · · · ∧2An)→ 2A n ≥ 0 (RK)
and, in particular, we shall consider
` A
` 2A (RK, n = 0) (Nec)
` A→ B
` 2A→ 2B (RK, n = 1) (RM)
` (A ∧B)→ C
` (2A ∧2B)→ 2C (RK, n = 2) (RR)
We can now classify modal logics according to their deductive power.
Definition 1. A modal logic Σ is:
1. monotonic iff it is closed under RM;
2. regular iff it is closed under RR;
3. normal iff it is closed under RK.
We can now formulate the relationships between the various classes of modal
logics
Theorem 1.
1. Every regular logic is monotonic;
2. Every normal logic is regular, and therefore monotonic.
Proof. For the proof see [3, 235].
According to [3] the smallest regular logic is called R, the smallest monotonic
logic M, and the smallest normal logic K.
The semantics of non-normal modal logic is given in terms of neighborhood
semantics. A model is a structure
M = 〈W,N, v〉
where W is a set of possible worlds, N is a function from W to P(P(W )) and
v is an evaluation function: v : WFF ×W 7→ {T, F}, where WFF is the set of
well-formed formulas.
Before providing the evaluation clauses for the formulas we need to define
the notion of truth set.
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Definition 2. Let M be a model and A be a formula. The truth set of A wrt to
M , ‖A‖M is thus defined:
‖A‖M = {w ∈W : v(A,w) = T} .
The evaluation clauses for atomic and boolean formulas are as usual while those
for modal operators are given below.
Definition 3. Let w be a world in M = 〈W,N, v〉:
1. w  2A ⇐⇒ ‖A‖M ∈ Nw;
2. w  3A ⇐⇒ W − ‖A‖M 6∈ Nw.
It is natural to add some conditions on the function N in neighborhood models.
The conditions relevant for the present work are given in the following definition.
Definition 4. LetM be a model. For every world w ∈W and every proposition
A, and B.
(m) If ‖A‖ ∩ ‖B‖ ⊆ Nw, then ‖A‖ ∈ Nw and ‖B‖ ∈ Nw;
(c) If ‖A‖ ∈ Nw and ‖B‖ ∈ Nw, then ‖A‖ ∩ ‖B‖ ∈ Nw;
(n) W ∈ Nw.
According as the functionN in a neighborhood model satisfies condition (m), (c),
or (n), we shall say that the model is supplemented, is closed under intersections,
or contains the unit. When a model is both supplemented and closed under
intersections then we shall call it a quasi-filter ; when a quasi-filter contains the
unit it is a filter.
We are now able to state the correspondence theorem for non-normal modal
logics.
Theorem 2.
1. M is characterized by the class of supplemented models;
2. R is characterized by the class of quasi-filters;
3. K is characterized by the class of filters.
Proof. For the proof see [3, 257]
From now on we shall use Σ A to denote that A is valid in the class of model
characterizing Σ.
3 KEM
KEM (see [1,10]) is a labelled analytic proof system based on a combination
of tableau and natural deduction inference rules which allows for a suitably re-
stricted (“analytic”) application of the cut rule; the label scheme arises from an
alphabet of constant and variable “world” symbols. A “world” label is either a
world-symbol or a “structured” sequence of world-symbols called “world-path”.
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Constant and variable world-symbols denote worlds and set of neighbors respec-
tively (in a neighborhood model), while a world-path conveys information about
access between the worlds in it. We attach labels to signed formulas (i.e., for-
mulas prefixed with either a “T” or a “F”) to yield labelled signed formulas
(LS-formulas). An LS-formula TA, i (FA, i) means that A is true (false) at the
(last) world (on the path) i. In the course of proofs labels are manipulated in
a way closely related to the modal semantics and “matched” using (specialized,
logic-dependent) unification algorithms.
4 Label Formalism
The set = of labels arises from two (non empty) sets ΦC = {w1, w2, . . . } (the set
of constant world symbols), and ΦV = {W1,W2, . . . } (the set of variable world
symbols) through the following
Definition 5.
= =
⋃
1≤i
=i where =i is :
=1 = ΦC ∪ ΦV ;
=2 = =1 × ΦC ;
=n+1 = =1 ×=n, n > 1.
That is, a world-label is either (i) an element of the set ΦC , or (ii) an element
of the set ΦV , or (iii) a path term (k′, k) where (iiia) k′ ∈ ΦC ∪ ΦV and (iiib)
k ∈ ΦC or k = (i′, i) where (i′, i) is a label. From now on we shall use i, j, k, . . .
to denote arbitrary labels.
For any label i = (k′, k) we shall call k′ the head of i, k the body of i,
and denote them by h(i) and b(i) respectively. Notice that these notions are
recursive (they correspond to projection functions): if b(i) denotes the body of
i, then b(b(i)) will denote the body of b(i), b(b(b(i))) will denote the body of
b(b(i)); and so on. We call each of b(i), b(b(i)), etc., a segment of i. Let s(i)
denote any segment of i (obviously, by definition every segment s(i) of a label i
is a label); then h(s(i)) will denote the head of s(i).
For any label i, we define the length of i, `(i), as the number of world-symbols
in i, i.e., `(i) = n⇔ i ∈ =n. sn(i) will denote the segment of i of length n, i.e.,
sn(i) = s(i) such that `(s(i)) = n. We shall use hn(i) as an abbreviation for
h(sn(i)).
For any label i, `(i) > n, we define the countersegment-n of i, as follows:
cn(i) = h(i)× (· · · × (hk(i)× (· · · × (hn+1(i), w0)))) (n < k < l(i))
where w0 is a dummy label. In other words the countersegment-n of a label i is
the label obtained from i by replacing sn(i) with a dummy world symbol.
Let us exemplify the notions introduced above: let us consider the label
i = (w5, (W4, (w3, (w2, w1)))). Obviously, the length of i, `(i), is 5: there are
five world symbols in i. The head of i, h(i), is the label w5, while its body, b(i),
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is (W4, (w3, (w2, w1))). The segment of length 2 of i, s2(i), is (w2, w1) and the
corresponding countersegment, c2(i), is the label (w5, (W4, (w3, w0))), where w0
stands for s2(i). However, it is worth noting that when we deal with counterseg-
ments w0 is conceived as world symbol.
5 Unifications
The key feature of KEM is that in the course of proof labels are manipulated in
a way closely related to the semantics of modal operators and “matched” using
a specialized unification algorithm. That two labels i and k are unifiable means,
intuitively, that the set of worlds they “denote” have a non-null intersection.
The basic element of the unification is the substitution function which maps
each variable in labels to a label, and each constant to itself.
The label unification is the core of KEM. The unifications for the various
logics, as usual, are defined from a substitution and imposing conditions on the
substitution produces the basic unification for the classes of logics we are dealing
with.
Let ρC be a substitution function defined on labels. We first build a basic
unification for the classes of logics, then we define the unifications corresponding
to the various modal axioms relying on basic unifications, finally we compose
the axiom unifications into the unifications for the corresponding logics.
First of all a label substitution ρC is built upon a “world” substitution θC as
follows:
ρC(i) =
{
i if i ∈ =1 ;
(θC(k), ρC(k′)) if i = (k, k′) .
For two labels i and j, and a substitution ρ, if ρ is a unifier of i and j then we
shall say that i, j are σC-unifiable. We shall use (i, j)σC to denote both that i
and j are σC-unifiable and the result of their unification. In particular
∀i, j, k ∈ =, (i, j)σC = k iff ∃ρC(ρC(i) = ρC(j) and ρC(i) = k) .
On this basis we may define several specialised, logic-dependent notions of σ-
unification characterizing the various modal logics. The first step in order to
define the unifications characterizing the various modal logic is to define unifica-
tions (axiom unifications) corresponding to the modal axioms. Then in the same
way a modal logic is obtained by combining several axioms we define combined
unifications, that, when applied recursively, produce logic unifications.
Let A be a modal axiom, then the general form of a σCA unification corre-
sponding to A is:
(i, j)σCA ⇐⇒ (fA(i), gA(j))σC and CA
where fA and gA are given logic-dependent functions from labels to labels and CA
is a set of constraints (see [10,1,7] for examples of axiom and logic unifications).
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A combined unification σCA1···An is generally defined as the combination of
the axiom unifications for the axioms A1, . . . , An characterizing the logic Σ.
(i, j)σCA1···An ⇐⇒

(i, j)σCA1 CA1 ;
...
...
(i, j)σCAn CAn .
Applying recursively the above σCA1···An unification we obtain the logic unifica-
tion σΣ .
(i, j)σΣ =
{
(i, j)σCA1···An ,
(cn(i), cm(j))σCA1···An
where w0 = (sn(i), sm(j))σΣ .
We shall denote the constants occurring in labels obtained as the result of
an unification with ∗, and we shall denote the set of such constants by Φ∗C .
It is worth noting that the variables can be mapped on more than a label in
the course of a proof; imposing restrictions on the number of labels a variable
can be mapped to in the course of a proof makes us able to characterize the
classes of modal logics at hand. More precisely the world substitutions for the
classes of logics under analysis are:
Monotonic Logics
θM : ΦV 7→ =branch injective
1Φ∗C
The condition for monotonic logics states that a variable can be mapped to
a unique label in a branch of a KEM-proof, while constants are mapped to
themselves only if they are the result of a unification. It is worth noting that it
is possible to map a variable to different labels if they occur in distinct branches.
Regular Logics
θR : ΦV 7→ =
1Φ∗C
For regular logics the restriction on variables is released, while that on constants
still obtains.
Normal Logics
θK : ΦV 7→ =
1ΦC
The substitution for normal logics is obtained from that for regular by dropping
the restriction on constants: each constant is mapped to itself.
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To explain the mechanics of the unifications we consider the regular logic R4
—R plus the axiom 4 (2A→ 22A). The axiom unification for 4 in R is
(i, j)σ4R =

c`(i)(j) `(j) > `(i), h(i) ∈ ΦV and
w0 = (i, s`(i)(j))σR ;
c`(j)(i) `(i) > `(j), h(j) ∈ ΦV and
w0 = (s`(j)(i), j)σR .
Accordingly, i = (w5, (w4, (w3, (W1, w1)))) and j = (W2, (w2, w1)) σ4R-unify on
(w5, (w4, (w3, (w2, w1)))) since c3(i) = (w5, (w4, w0)), and w0 = (s3(i), j)σR: it
is immediate to see that s3(i) = (w3, (W1, w1)) and j σR-unify.
From the above unification we obtain the combined unification for R4, namely:
(i, j)σR4 =
{
(i, j)σR `(i) = `(j) ;
(i, j)σ4R `(i) 6= `(j) .
The logic unification for R4 is given by the recursive iteration of the combined
unification σR4.
(i, j)σR4 =
{
(i, j)σR4 ,
(cn(i), cm(j))σR4
where w0 = (sn(i), sm(j))σR4. Then the labels (w5, (w4, (w3, (W1, w1)))) and
(W2, (w2, w1)) σR4-unify since they σ4R-unify; the labels (w3, (W1, w1)) and
(W2, (w2, w1)) σR4-unify since they σR-unify. We consider now the labels i =
(W2, (w3, (w2, w1))) and j = (w5, (w4, (W1, w1))). It is immediate to see that they
do not σ4R- nor σR-unify. However, c3(i) = (W2, w0) and c2(j) = (w5, (w4, w0))
σR4-unify, and so do s3(i) = (w3, (w2, w1)) and s2(i) = (W1, w1). Therefore i
and j σR4-unify.
6 Inference Rules
In displaying the rules of KEM we shall use Smullyan-Fitting α, β, ν, pi unifying
notation [6]. If X is an LS-formula, XC denotes the conjugate of X, i.e., the
result of changing the sign of X to its opposite; two LS-formulas X, i and XC , k
such that (i, k)σΣ will be called σΣ-complementary.
α, i
αn, i
[n = 1, 2] (α)
The α rules are just the familiar linear branch-expansion rules of the tableau
method.
β, i
βCn , j
β3−n(i, j)σΣ
[(i, j)σΣ , n = 1, 2] (β)
The β are nothing else than natural inference patterns such as Modus Ponens,
Modus Tollens and Disjunctive syllogism generalized to the modal case. In order
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to apply such rules it is required that the labels of the premises unify and the
label of the conclusion is the result of their unification.
ν, i
ν0, (Wn, i)
[Wn new] (ν)
pi, i
pi0, (wn, i)
[wn new] (pi)
ν and pi rules allow us to expand labels according to the intended semantics,
where, with “new” we means that the label does not occur previously in the
tree. It is worth noting that the proviso “Wn new” is not necessary for normal
logics, but this is not the case for non-normal ones; this is due to the fact that
the meaning of Wn wrt to normal modal logic is the set of worlds accessible
from i, while for non-normal modal logic it denotes a set of neighbors of i, and
a world may have several sets of neighbors.
X, i XC , i
[i restricted] (PB)
PB (the “Principle of Bivalence”) represents the (LS-version of the) semantic
counterpart of the cut rule of the sequent calculus (intuitive meaning: a formula
A is either true or false in any given world).
X, i
XC , j
× [(i, j)σΣ ] (PNC)
PNC (the “Principle of Non-Contradiction”) corresponds to the familiar branch-
closure rule of the tableau method, saying that from a contradiction of the form
(occurrence of a pair of σΣ-complementary LS-formulas) X, i and XC , j on a
branch we may infer the closure of the branch. The (i, j)σΣ in the “conclusion”
of PNC means that the contradiction holds “in the same world”.
As usual with refutation methods, a proof of a formula A of Σ consists of
attempting to construct a counter-model for A by assuming that A is false in
some arbitrary model for Σ. Every successful proof discovers a contradiction in
the putative counter-model. In what follows by a KEM-tree we shall mean a
tree generated by the inference rules of KEM. A branch τ of a KEM-tree will be
said to be σΣ-closed if it ends with an application of PNC. A KEM-tree T will
be said to be σΣ-closed if all its branches are σΣ-closed. Finally, by a Σ-proof
of a formula A we shall mean σΣ-closed KEM-tree starting with FA, i, where i
is a constant world-symbol. We shall use `KEM(Σ) A to denote that there is a
Σ-proof of A.
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To illustrate the proof procedure we consider the formula C = 2A ∧ 2B →
2(A ∧B). C is a theorem of every regular logic but not of monotonic logics.
1. F2A ∧2B → 2(A ∧B) w1
2. T2A ∧2B w1
3. F2(A ∧B) w1
4. T2A w1
5. T2B w1
6. FA ∧B (w2, w1)
7. TA (W1, w1)
8. TB (W2, w1)
9. FB (w∗2 , w1)
The steps from 1 to 8 are straightforward. 9 has been derived from an application
of a β rule on 6 and 7. If we are in a monotonic logic then the tree is completed,
every non atomic formula has been analysed and it is not possible to apply PNC
on 8 and 9, since their labels do not unify: the variable W2 cannot be mapped to
w2, because W1 is already mapped to w1, and θM must be injective. Otherwise,
in a regular logic, θR is not required to be injective, thus W2 can be mapped to
w2. In this way the formulas in 8 and 9 become complementary, therefore PNC
is applicable, the tree is closed, and thus we have a KEM-proof of C.
7 Soundness and Completeness
In order to prove soundness and completeness of KEM with respect to the classes
of logics and models of Theorem 2, we have to show that the rules RM, RR, and
RK are derived rules in KEM. This can be easily achieved by drawing a KEM-
proof for them. Here we just provide the proof for RM in M; the proofs for the
remaining rules and logics are similar.
6. TA→ B (w2, w1)
8. TB (w∗2 , w1)
9. × (w∗2 , w1)
7. FA→ B (w2, w1)
10. B (w∗2 , w1)
11. ×
1. F2A→ 2B w1
2. T2A w1
3. F2B w1
4. TA (W1, w1)
5. FB (w2, w1)
To show that there is a KEM-proof we have to provide a closed KEM-tree for
F2A → 2B given that a KEM-tree (B) for FA → B closes. The steps 1–5 are
immediate; at this point we apply PB wrt to A→ B, and label (w2, w1). In the
left branch we can apply a β-rule on 4 and 6, thus obtaining 8 and closing the
branch. In the right branch we can repeat the proof for FA → B with label
(w∗2 , w1), and so also this branch is closed.
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D’Agostino and Mondadori [5] have proved that Modus Ponens (if ` A, and
` A→ B, them ` B) is a derived rule of KE, the propositional modulo of KEM.
Moreover they proved that KE is sound and complete with respect to classical
propositional logic.
From the above considerations and Theorem 2 we can conclude
Theorem 3. Σ A⇒`KEM(Σ) A.
To prove the second part of the correspondence theorem for KEM, we have to
show that KEM rules and unifications are sound with respect to the appropriate
model. To this end we define some functions mapping LS-formulas on elements
of a model, according to the structure of the labels.
Let g be a function from = to P(W ) such that:
g(i) =
{
h(i) = {h(i)} h(i) ∈ ΦC
h(i) = {wi ∈ W : ∃X (X ∈ Ng∗(b(i)) ∧ wi ∈ X )} h(i) ∈ ΦV
where g∗ is a selection function over g(i); if h(i) ∈ ΦC and `(i) > 1:
g(i) = {h(i)} ⊆ {wi ∈ W : ∃X (X ∈ Ng∗(b(i)) ∧ wi ∈ X )}
Let r be a function from = to N such that:
r(i) =
{
∅ `(i) = 1
g(in) ∈ Ng∗(in−1), (n > 1) `(i) > 1
Finally let f be a function from the set of LS-formulas to v such that:
f(SA, i) =def v(A,wj) = S
for every wj ∈ g(i).
Let F be a set of LS-formulas and L be the set of labels occurring in F ; the
function gΣ , Σ = M,R, from L to PP(W) produces an Σ-model starting from
the LS-formulas in F .
gΣ :L 7→ N such that ∀i, j, k ∈ L
Σ = M : if g(i) ⊆ g(k) and g(i) ∈ Ng∗(j) then g(k) ∈ Ng∗(j) ;
Σ = R : if g(i) ∈ Ng∗(j) and g(k) ∈ Ng∗(j) then g(i) ∩ g(k) ∈ Ng∗(j) ;
Moreover it satisfies the following condition: let i, and j be label; if h(i) ∈ ΦV ,
h(j) ∈ ΦC , and there exists a world substitution θC such that θC(h(i)) = h(j),
then g(j) ⊆ g(i).
A KEM-tree with n branches is a collection of F1, . . . ,Fn where
⋂Fn 6= ∅
since it contains at least the origin of the tree.
Lemma 1. For any i, k ∈ = if (i, k)σL then g(i) ∩ g(k) 6= ∅.
Proof. The proof is similar to that given by [1,10] for normal modal logics.
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This lemma shows that if two labels unify, then the result of their σΣ-unification
corresponds to an element of the appropriate model. In this way, we are able to
build the neighborhood model for the labels involved in a KEM-proof, and so
we can check every rule of KEM in a standard semantic setting:
Theorem 4. `KEM(Σ) A⇒ Σ A.
From theorems 3 and 4 we obtain:
Theorem 5. `KEM(Σ) A ⇐⇒ Σ A.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have provided a uniform and modular automated proof system
for non-normal modal logics. The system enjoys two orthogonal kinds of modu-
larity: the first one with respect to the substitutions determining the classes of
modal logic and the second one with respect to the unifications corresponding
to the various modal axioms.
It is possible to claim that the system here presented is more efficient than the
system proposed in [6]. Such a method takes a direct approach and uses prefixes
to keep trace of the relation among possible worlds. However, it suffers from
the drawback of duplicating formulas. It is easy to see that when the duplicate
formulas behave disjunctively, the duplication implies an exponential increase of
the complexity. On the other hand the complexity of KEM unification algorithm
is linear (at least for the basic cases), so we can build examples such that the
length of KEM proof is linear while Fitting’s prefix tableaux has exponential
proofs.
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